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ABSTRACT
Th e paper examines, through the prism of the European Commission’s Recommendation, 
the European approach on collective redress. First, it demonstrates that the introduction 
of collective redress in respect of small claims is necessary and the opt-out scheme is 
preferable. Second, it refutes the major arguments and fears against the opt-out system. 
Th ird, it demonstrates that the pivotal question of collective redress is fi nancing and the 
law should provide a risk premium to the group representative.
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§1. INTRODUCTION
On 11 June 2013, the European Commission published a Recommendation on collective 
redress (the Recommendation),1 proposing that Member States adopt collective redress 
* Csongor István Nagy, LL.M., Ph.D., S.J.D, dr. juris is an Associate Professor in Hungary, the head of 
the Department of Private International Law at the University of Szeged, Faculty of Law, the leader of 
the Federal Markets ‘Momentum’ Research Group at the Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, and an attorney-at-law admitted to the Budapest Bar. Furthermore, he is visiting 
professor at the Sapientia University of Transylvania (Romania) and at the Riga Graduate School of Law 
(Latvia). His paper was written with the generous support of the Hungarian Scientifi c Research Fund, 
within the frame of the OTKA PD-101612 research programme. Th e author is indebted to Professor 
Albert Foer, Professor Marie-Pierre Granger, Professor Antonio Gidi, Professor Joël Monéger, Mr 
Frédéric Pelouze and Professor Spencer Weber Waller for their help and comments on the earlier draft  
of this paper. Of course, all views and any errors remain the author’s own. He is currently Fulbright 
visiting professor at Indiana University, Bloomington.
Th e European Collective Redress Debate aft er the European Commission’s Recommendation
22 MJ 4 (2015) 531
mechanisms for violations of EU law. Th e Recommendation adopted a conservative 
approach, expressing a strong preference towards the opt-in system.2 Th is means that only 
those group members in a class action who expressly assented to the collective action are 
involved in it: contrary to the ‘notice and opt-out’ (hereaft er, ‘opt-out’) system, where silence 
implies assent and those group members who do not want to get involved have to opt out.
Th e Recommendation seems to put an end to a decade-long European debate on 
collective redress, which – on the level of EU law – ignited in the context of competition 
law’s private enforcement and then gradually also spread to other fi elds of law.
Collective redress is an extremely controversial issue, and its history in Europe is full 
of hesitation, scare-mongering and phobia of novel legal solutions.
By way of example, although Italy adopted a law on collective proceedings in 2007, the 
entry into force of this law was suspended for two years and, fi nally, a new act was adopted in 
2009.3 In Hungary, the President of the Republic vetoed an Act on class actions adopted by 
the Hungarian parliament in 2010 (the act followed the opt-out approach).4 In July 2009, the 
conversion of the opt-in scheme into an opt-out system was refused in England and Wales.5
It is an interesting facet of the history of collective redress in Europe that proposals 
and conceptions elaborated by scholars and experts are torpedoed by intensive economic 
lobbying6 and fail to get through the political fi lter: in some cases they were fully rejected 
1 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law, [2013] OJ L 201/60.
2 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law, para. 21 (‘Th e claimant party should be formed on the basis of express consent of the 
natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed (“opt-in” principle). Any exception to this 
principle, by law or by court order, should be duly justifi ed by reasons of sound administration of 
justice.’). For a general overview on the Recommendation see S. Weber Waller, ‘Th e Fall and Rise of the 
Antitrust Class Action’, SSRN (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641867, p. 14–20.
3 See Act 244 of 24 December 2007 (Legge 24 Dicembre 2007, n. 244), Act 99 of 23 July 2009 (Legge 23 
Luglio 2009, n. 99), www.tedioli.com/Italian_class_action_text_english_version.pdf; M. Siragusa and 
E. Guerri, ‘Collective Actions in Italy: Too Much Noise for Nothing?’, 1 Global Competition Litig. Rev. 
(2008), p. 32; R. Nashi, ‘Italy’s Class Action Experiment’, 43 Cornell Int’l L.J. (2010), p. 147.
4 See Proposal No T/11332 on the Amendment of Act III of 1952 on the Civil Procedure (T/11332. számú 
törvényjavaslat a polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi III. törvény módosításáról). As noted above, 
the proposal was vetoed by the President of the Republic of Hungary. Th e Budapest Bar also expressed 
its concerns as to the text of the Proposal.
5 Th e Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report, Improving Access to Justice through 
Collective Actions (2009), http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20100208150045/http:/www.justice.
gov.uk/about/docs/government-response-cjc-collective-actions.pdf. See C. Hodges, ‘Collective Redress 
in Europe: Th e New Model’, 29 Civil Justice Q. (2010), p. 370, 376–379; C. Hodges, ‘From Class Actions 
to Collective Redress: A Revolution in Approach to Compensation’, 28 Civil Just. Q. (2009), p. 41, 50–66.
6 ‘Th ere is a strong, well-organized, well-funded and infl uential opposition to the proposal on class 
actions’. P.H. Lindblom, ‘Grupptryck mot grupptalan’ (Group Pressure against Group Action), Svensk 
Juristtidning (1996), p. 85, quoted in M. Välimäki, ‘Introducing Class Actions in Finland – Lawmaking 
Without Economic Analysis’, SSRN (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261623, p. 9, footnote 32. See M. 
Välimäki, ‘Introducing Class Actions in Finland – Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis’, SSRN (2007), 
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(for example in England and Wales in 2009,7 though recently the opt-out scheme was made 
available in competition law, subject to the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s discretion).8 
In other cases, the initially progressive and eff ective proposal was emasculated, and 
the version that was fi nally adopted was deprived of all the virtues that could make the 
system workable and widespread (see Finland9 or France).10
Unfortunately, the development of EU collective redress is not diff erent from the above 
experience. In October 2009, the European Commission withdrew its proposal for an opt-
out system11 while it launched a public consultation on the matter 1.5 years later. And in 
June 2013, the Commission published the most recent Recommendation, which is, to put it 
mildly, a disappointing turnaround establishing a feeble and emasculated scheme. Of course, 
it would be unfair not to mention that the Commission shares the political responsibility 
with the European Parliament, which was the fi rst to cave in to industry lobbying and to 
reject the opt-out system with arguments peculiar to phobia of foreign legal solutions.12
Th is paper examines, through the prism of the most recent Recommendation, 
the European approach on group organization costs and fi nancing. Th e enforcement 
of collective claims, like the enforcement of individual claims, hinges on costs and 
fi nancing. However, it is an important diff erence between individual and collective 
actions that, in the latter case, there are considerable organization costs, which, in certain 
matters, may prove to be prohibitive. Further, due to the involvement of a third party 
(group representative),13 fi nancing may become more complicated. An opt-out system 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261623, p. 1, 3; P.H. Lindblom, ‘National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden’, 
Th e Globalization of Class Actions (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/fi les/
documents/Sweden_National_Report.pdf, p. 9, 31; P.H. Lindblom, ‘National report: Group Litigation in 
Sweden, update paper sections 2.5 and 3’, Globalclassactions (2008), http://globalclassactions.stanford.
edu/sites/default/fi les/documents/Sweden_Update_paper_Nov%20–08.pdf, p. 14.
7 Th e Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report, Improving Access to Justice through 
Collective Actions (2009).
8 Th e Competition Appeal Tribunal specifi es in the collective proceedings order whether the procedure 
has to be carried out in the opt-in or the opt-out system. Sections 47A-49E of Competition Act 1998, 
inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
9 M. Välimäki, ‘Introducing Class Actions in Finland – Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis’, SSRN 
(2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261623, p. 3.
10 Th e introduction of collective redress into French law had been examined by two professional 
committees in the era long before the adoption of the new provisions of the French Consumer Code 
(Code de la consummation) in 2014. Both committees proposed the introduction of a quasi-opt-out 
scheme. However, the legislator did not follow any of them. V. Magnier, ‘Class actions, group litigation 
& other forms of collective litigation – France’, Globalclassactions (2007), http://globalclassactions.
stanford.edu/sites/default/fi les/documents/France_National_Report.pdf, p. 4.
11 Th e text is available in P. Lowe and M. Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2011: Integrating 
Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies (Hart 
Publishing, 2014), p. 513. See M. Ioannidou, ‘Enhancing the Consumers’ Role in EU Private Competition 
Law Enforcement: A Normative and Practical Approach’, 8 Competition L. Rev. (2011), p. 59, 78–80.
12 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress’, (2011/2089(INI)).
13 Th ough the group representative may be a group member, he still qualifi es as a third party as to the 
claims of the rest of the group.
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lessens the group’s organization costs signifi cantly and makes collective redress possible 
in cases where such costs proved to be prohibitive. However, collective redress cannot 
be truly eff ective without appropriate funding; this does not mean that no cases would 
be brought to court: this means that the practical success of collective redress would be 
moderate (or more moderate than it should be).
First, this article demonstrates that the introduction of collective redress in respect 
of small claims is necessary and the opt-out scheme is preferable. Th e paper presents 
the hurdles which the enforcement of small claims encounters and demonstrates how 
collective redress makes these claims enforceable in practice. Although the group’s 
organization costs can be reduced through diff erent techniques (for instance, through 
easing adhesion), the most cost-eff ective method is the opt-out system, which is capable 
of reducing the costs to the minimum (albeit certainly not to zero).
Second, the paper refutes the major arguments and fears against the opt-out system. It 
examines the problem of ‘representation without authorization’ and demonstrates that this 
is not incompatible either with national constitutional requirements or with the European 
legal traditions. It also demonstrates that a collective redress system based on opt-out is 
feasible and would cause no litigation boom, and would create no blackmailing potential.
Th ird, the paper demonstrates that the pivotal question of collective redress is 
fi nancing and that the law should provide a risk premium to the group representative. 
Group representatives are expected to take over the group’s case and to invest in the 
business of someone else, without having a clear prospect of reward. Even if reasonable 
expenses are remunerated without a risk premium (compensating the representative for 
the risk he runs in the interest of group members), group representatives will be disinclined 
to undertake the burden of group representation. Th e Recommendation rejects those 
legal institutions of US law that aff ord a risk premium to group representatives and that 
make the US class action operational. On the other hand, it fails to suggest alternative 
measures that could handle this problem. Th us, not only does the Recommendation 
create a sluggish collective redress scheme (by not minimizing the organization costs), at 
the same time it also fails to oil it up to make it operational.
§2. WHY ARE SMALL CLAIMS NOT ENFORCED AND HOW 
CAN COLLECTIVE REDRESS MAKE THESE CLAIMS 
ENFORCEABLE IN PRACTICE?
‘Rights which cannot be enforced in practice are worthless.’14 Small claims face hurdles 
that may prevent individual enforcement and lead to sub-optimal law enforcement.15
14 European Commission Staff  Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a coherent European 
approach to collective redress, SEC(2011) 173 fi nal, para 1.1.
15 For a detailed elaboration of the analysis set forth in this section see C.I. Nagy, ‘Comparative Collective 
Redress from a Law and Economics Perspective: Without Risk Th ere Is No Reward!’, 19 Columbia 
Journal of European Law (2013), p. 469–498.
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First, non-recoverable legal costs may deter litigation. Although in Europe legal costs 
are, in principle and with some restrictions, borne by the losing party, the winning party 
cannot shift  the legal costs in full. Th e proof and documentation of the legal costs may 
be diffi  cult; the law may restrict the amount of the attorney’s fee that can be shift ed onto 
the losing party; the claim’s enforcement may give rise to some practically unrecoverable 
expenses. Furthermore, certain expenses cannot be shift ed onto the losing party (these 
costs are not legally shift able). Examples are inconveniences related to the litigation and 
the time the claimant spends on the claim. Obviously, such expenses may emerge in any 
matter, but in respect of small claims these costs are comparably much higher given the 
small pecuniary value involved.
Second, the costs for the preliminary legal assessment may also dissuade the plaintiff . 
Although theoretically these may be regarded as shift able expenses (as these emerge in 
relation to the litigation), information shortage pertains to such situations. Th e preliminary 
legal assessment occurs at a stage where the claimant has no information about his chances, 
so he has to take into account that he may have to pay even if there is no reason to sue.
Th ird, in the context of small claims, the value at stake is small and legal costs are, in 
comparison to the claim’s value, very high – here, a relatively trivial probability of failure 
may make the balance of litigation negative. Th e higher the legal costs are in relation 
to the claim’s value, the better this risk crops out. As a matter of practice, litigation 
inevitably involves some risk and almost all claims have immanent hazards.
All in all, in case of small-value claims it may be economically unreasonable to 
litigate (the expected costs may be higher than the expected value) even in well-founded 
cases of merit.
Collective redress has certain advantages that make the enforcement of small claims 
possible in cases where numerous persons are damaged by the same illegal act. Although 
damages are small for each individual (which may make litigation unreasonable), 
collective damages (the sum of various individuals’ damages) are high. Th e merit of 
collective redress can be attributed to two virtues: economies of scale16 and tackling the 
external economic eff ects (externalities).
Joint litigation may entail economies of scale and is susceptible to doing away with the 
external economic eff ects individual litigation may cause. Th is is due to the fact that the 
enforcement of individual small claims may have signifi cant common costs.17 Although 
it is true that this is a general advantage of joint litigation (that is, it may equally emerge 
in cases where the claims are not of small value), with small claims, the cost-savings are 
comparably higher than in the case of huge claims.
In related matters, litigation costs are oft en not commensurable to the number of 
the claimants, since certain expenses (testimonies, deliberation of liability, and so on) 
16 See, e.g., T.S. Ulen, ‘An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Class Action Litigation’, 32 Eur. J.L. 
& Econ. (2011), p. 185, 187.
17 See R. Bone, Civil Procedure: Th e Economics of Civil Procedure (Foundation Press, 2003), p. 261–265.
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emerge only once.18 A substantial part of the legal costs may be fi xed costs, which emerge 
independently of the number of the claimants, while the rest may be made up of variable 
costs, which are aff ected by the number of the claimants. If the loss is caused by the same 
wrong, there may be common (fi xed) costs; and if these are signifi cant in comparison to 
individual costs, collective redress may be cost-eff ective.
Individual litigation may entail positive external eff ects (externalities), conferring 
advantages on other class members they did not pay for. Th e diff erence between the 
expected costs and the expected value may be negative at the individual level but positive 
at the group (or social) level. Since the individual litigator does not benefi t from the 
positive external economic eff ects enjoyed by other group members (that is, these benefi ts 
are not internalized), this may lead to sub-optimal litigation. Although one might argue 
that test cases might eff ectively substitute collective litigation, this is refuted by the fact 
that test cases may entail free-riding: non-active group members may free-ride on the 
eff orts of the individual litigator who started the test case.19
Aft er having demonstrated that collective litigation makes the enforcement of small 
claims a reality also in cases where individual litigation would not pay out, the question 
to be addressed is why collective litigation does not occur spontaneously? Why do group 
members not use the traditional legal tools (joinder of claims,20 assignment of claims to 
an entity founded by group members)21 to organize the group? Th e reason is the cost of 
group organization. Th ese costs may be very high, in some cases even prohibitive,22 and 
traditional legal tools are not tailored to the needs of collective litigation, thus increasing 
the costs of group management.23
All in all, the conclusion may be drawn that the enforcement of small claims, in certain 
cases, may be sub-optimal, and collective litigation may make litigation possible also 
in cases where individual enforcement would not be economically rational. Collective 
litigation may entail costs-savings due to economies of scale and may tackle the problem 
of positive externalities. Furthermore, in case of small claims, collective litigation 
necessitates regulatory intervention, since, due to the high organization costs, it would 
not work spontaneously. Hence, the law has to tackle the problem of organization costs 
so as to make the enforcement of these claims a reality.
18 T.S. Ulen, 32 Eur. J.L. & Econ. (2011), p. 185, 187.
19 At the same moment, not only positive but also negative external eff ects may be present here. If group 
members sue on an individual basis and the defendant wins against the fi rst plaintiff , this may have a 
negative impact on subsequent plaintiff s. Although the judgment given in the case of one of the group 
members has no res judicata eff ects in actions brought by other group members, the judgment in the 
fi rst case may have precedential value or at least persuasive authority. Hence, the defendant may fi nd 
it rational to invest much more in winning the early cases, because winning in these proceedings may 
discourage later litigation. T.S. Ulen, 32 Eur. J.L. & Econ. (2011), p. 185, 189.
20 C.I. Nagy, ‘A Csoportos Igényérvényesítés Gazdaságtana és Lehetőségei a Magyar Jogban’, 3 
Jogtudományi Közlöny (2011), p. 163.
21 Ibid.
22 T.S. Ulen, 32 Eur. J.L. & Econ. (2011), p. 185, 191.
23 For a detailed analysis see C.I. Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law (2013), p. 469, 478–479.
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Th ere are various tools which can be used to handle the problem of organization costs. 
Some of them reduce these costs, while some of them tackle the risks attached to them. 
First, the opt-out system decreases organizational costs considerably,24 although these 
expenses can be mitigated in the opt-in system. Second, eff ective cost-shift ing can also 
mitigate the negative eff ects of the organizational costs problem: if the group representative 
can expect reimbursement for reasonable organizational costs he may be more inclined to 
incur them. For this reason, the ‘loser pays’ principle has to be extended to organizational 
costs. Th ird, the group representative should be granted a risk premium. Th e reason is that 
the group representative runs a risk (the risk of losing the case and, thus, his investment) 
in favour of the group members, and he has to be compensated for the risks he takes. 
Otherwise, the balance of the expected costs and expected value would be negative and it 
would be economically irrational for the group representative to take up the case.
In sum, collective litigation can be made eff ective only if regulatory measures are 
taken. First, organizational costs have to be reduced. Second, the group representative has 
to be compensated in the form of a risk premium for the risk he runs in favour of group 
members (that is, for the risk that he would lose the case and would not be reimbursed for 
the legal expenses, and that he would be held liable for the defendant’s legal costs).
§3. WHY ARE THE MAJOR OBJECTIONS AND FEARS 
AGAINST THE OPT-OUT SYSTEM UNFOUNDED?
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND 
TACIT ADHERENCE
Th e opt-out system may raise constitutional concerns, since ‘representation without 
authorization’ may impair a party’s private autonomy, which consists in this context of 
the right to decide whether or not to enforce a claim and how to enforce it.25 However, 
there are quite a few compelling arguments that suggest that the opt-out scheme, as 
far as small claims are concerned, should not be outright unconstitutional. Although 
collective redress may certainly be shaped in a manner that goes counter to constitutional 
requirements, the constitutional concerns relating to small claims are mainly an optical 
illusion.
First, in the absence of a collective redress mechanism, numerous small claims would 
not get to court, and the collective action confers solely benefi ts to group members 
24 Compare J.G. Delatre, ‘Beyond the White Paper: Rethinking the Commission’s Proposal on Private 
Antitrust Litigation’, 8 Competition L. Rev. (2011), p. 29, 38 (submitting that opt-out collective action 
would be suffi  cient ‘on its own and without further incentives to lead to a substantial increase in the 
number of victims compensated’).
25 Commission Communication Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, 
COM(2013) 401 fi nal, p. 11.
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(provided they do not run the risk of being liable for the defendant’s legal costs in case 
the group representative fails to win the action). It would be perverse to refer to the 
impairment of private autonomy in a case characterized by obligee inertia,26 where the 
law does not ensure the claim’s practical enforceability.
Second, opt-out systems embed, by defi nition, the right to opt out. While mandatory 
representation (that is, when group members are compelled to be part of the group and 
cannot opt out) may obviously go counter to the right to private autonomy (that is, the 
right to decide whether to sue or not, and how to enforce the claim), there is no ‘forced 
membership’ in case of an opt-out system. Group members can leave the group without 
any further action ado. Th e opt-out scheme merely reverses the mechanism of adherence 
and infers assent from silence. In principle, a group member has to submit a declaration 
if he envisages being part of the action. In the opt-out system a group member has to 
submit a declaration if he does not want to be part of the claim. Th e group member 
makes the decision; and since experience shows that the vast majority of group members 
do not opt out, it is reasonable to reverse the mechanism of adherence.27
It has to be noted that the opt-out system is much more constitutional and preserves 
private autonomy much better than the Injunction Directive28 covering thirteen 
consumer protection directives.29 Th e Directive authorizes various entities to launch 
proceedings for a declaratory judgment or injunction on behalf of a class of unidentifi ed 
26 See T. Eisenberg and G.P. Miller, ‘Th e Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: 
Th eoretical and Empirical Issues’, 57 Vanderbilt Law Review (2004), p. 1529, 1532; S. Issacharoff  and 
G.P. Miller, ‘Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?’, 62 Vanderbilt Law Review (2009), p.  179, 
203–206; S. Issachoroff  and G.P. Miller, ‘Will aggregate litigation come to Europe?’, in G. Backhaus, 
A. Cassone and G.B. Ramello (eds.), Th e Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe: Lessons from 
America (Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 37, 60.
27 See T. Eisenberg and G.P. Miller, 57 Vanderbilt Law Review (2004), p. 1529, 1532; S. Issacharoff  and G.P. 
Miller, 62 Vanderbilt Law Review (2009), p. 179, 203–206; S. Issachoroff  and G.P. Miller, in G. Backhaus, 
A. Cassone and G.B. Ramello (eds.), Th e Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe: Lessons from 
America, p. 37, 60.
28 Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, [2009] OJ L 110/30.
29 Th e Directive covers, among others, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
(Unfair Terms Directive), [1993] OJ L 95/29. Th e Court of Justice (CJEU) established in relation to the 
Unfair Terms Directive in Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt., 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:242, para. 43–44, that judgments rendered in collective actions launched on the basis 
of Article 7 of the Unfair Terms Directive may and shall have legal eff ects on all interested consumers. 
‘[T]he national courts are required (…) to draw all the consequences provided for by national law in 
order to ensure that consumers who have concluded a contract to which those GBC [general business 
conditions] apply will not be bound by that term’; the Directive ‘does not preclude the declaration of 
invalidity of an unfair term included in the GBC of consumer contracts in an action for an injunction 
(…) from producing, in accordance with that legislation, eff ects with regard to all consumers who 
concluded with the seller or supplier concerned a contract to which the same GBC apply, including 
with regard to those consumers who were not party to the injunction proceedings’; ‘where the unfair 
nature of a term in the GBC has been acknowledged in such proceedings, national courts are required, of 
their own motion, and also with regard to the future, to take such action thereon as is provided for by 
national law in order to ensure that consumers who have concluded a contract with the seller or supplier 
to which those GBC apply will not be bound by that term.’ (emphasis added).
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consumers without the need for any individual authorization or assent, and, theoretically, 
it does not make it possible for group members to leave the group. Th is means that group 
members cannot opt-out even if they want to; they are stuck in the group. Still, the 
constitutionality of the Injunction Directive has not been questioned.
Th ird, it has to be noted that while the right of disposition is constitutionally 
protected, access to justice is equally a constitutional right. Th e purpose of collective 
redress is to make practically unenforceable rights a reality.
Fourth, cases that can be raised from national constitutional laws, used as arguments 
that the opt-out scheme is irreconcilable with national constitutional requirements, can 
be distinguished from the enforcement of small pecuniary claims in an opt-out collective 
procedure. In fact, in 2014 the French Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) 
confi rmed the recently introduced French regulatory regime, which, in certain points, 
has salient opt-out features.
France introduced a collective redress mechanism for consumers in 2014,30 and it 
was scrutinized and endorsed by the French Constitutional Council.31
Th e new French regulatory regime establishes a truly unique system (action de groupe 
à la française), which combines the elements of the opt-out and opt-in model. Even 
though French law retained the requirement that the consumer has to adhere through 
an express declaration, this declaration has to be submitted only aft er the judgment is 
made, when the consumer turns the award into cash.
Th e scheme appears to be a de facto opt-out system, although the consumer’s right 
to opt-in is retained and can be exercised aft er the judgment is made. Th is is, to some 
extent, comparable to the opt-out system, since even there, at the end of the day, group 
members may have to act in order to receive their share of the award. At the same time, 
there is a real diff erence between the ‘action de groupe à la française’ and opt-out class 
action. In the former case, the judgment’s res judicata eff ect extends to the group member 
only if aft er having been duly informed he expressly accepts the judgment and the 
compensation. If a group member thinks that he can reach a more favourable award, he 
can enforce his claim individually. However, this seems to be a rather formal diff erence: 
it is highly unlikely that in the subsequent individual action the court would reach a 
diff erent conclusion. Taking into account the rule that the consumer has to step in only 
in the last phase, aft er the legal situation has been fi xed, and assuming that consumers 
will go their own way extremely rarely, this system could be qualifi ed as a de facto opt-
out scheme.
Th e French consumer code (Code de la consommation) establishes a standard group 
procedure and a simplifi ed procedure. Th e simplifi ed procedure32 applies if the identity 
30 Act 2014–344 of 17 March 2014 (Loi n° 2014–344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation publiée au 
Journal Offi  ciel du 18 mars 2014).
31 Decision 2014–690 of 13 March 2014 (Le 14 novembre 2014, JORF n°0065 du 18 mars 2014, Texte n° 2, 
Décision n° 2014–690 DC du 13 mars 2014).
32 Article L423–10 of the French Consumer Code.
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and the number of the injured consumers are known and they sustained either a harm 
of the same amount, of the same amount per a given service or of the same amount for a 
given period. According to these criteria, the court may establish the defendant’s liability 
and order it to compensate group members directly and individually within the deadline 
set by the court. Th e only element which obscures the opt-out nature of this procedure 
is the rule providing that the consumer can be compensated only aft er accepting to be 
compensated according to the terms of the judgment. Th e simplifi ed procedure has the 
strongest opt-out features. From the perspective of res judicata eff ects, this rule preserves, 
indeed, the opt-in nature of the procedure, since if the consumer is not content with the 
judgment, he may take the route of individual litigation. However, notwithstanding the 
lack of res judicata eff ects, as noted above, it is highly unrealistic that the court would 
come to a diff erent conclusion in the subsequent individual litigation. Furthermore, as a 
matter of fact, the simplifi ed procedure does not make express adherence a pre-condition 
of the procedure and the judgment. Further, it does not require much more activity from 
the consumer than opt-out systems would require: the consumer would have to act at the 
payment or enforcement stage anyway (for example, contact the group representative or 
the court, initiate the enforcement of the judgment).
Th e standard procedure follows the same logic.33 In the fi rst phase, the judge – as 
a result of the group representative’s action – decides on the merits of the case, insofar 
this is possible. It establishes the defendant’s liability, defi nes the group and establishes 
the applicable criteria, determines the harms that can be compensated in respect of all 
consumers or all categories of consumers, including the amount and the elements, which 
permit the evaluation of the harm. Furthermore, the court establishes the measures that 
have to be adopted to inform group members and fi xes a deadline for adherence. In the 
second, out-of-court phase, group members are informed and have to decide whether they 
want to be covered by the judgment. In the ideal case, the defendant pays compensation 
to them. Should this not happen, the action moves to the third phase. In this phase, the 
court decides on the eventual diffi  culties of enforcement and on individual cases where 
the defendant refused to pay. Accordingly, the court already decides on the merits of the 
case in the fi rst phase, at this stage, the consumers’ express adherence is not required, 
and consumers have to decide whether they want to be compensated. Th e third stage 
is left  for fi ne-tuning and individual aspects. Again, the judgment’s res judicata eff ect 
is conditional on the consumer’s acceptance of the judgment. However, this appears to 
be a rather formal diff erence from the opt-out system: as noted above, it seems to be 
highly unrealistic that the court would come to a diff erent conclusion in the subsequent 
individual litigation than in the collective action.
It appears that for the French Constitutional Council it was decisive that the res 
judicata eff ect of the court’s judgment in collective actions covers solely those group 
33 Articles L423–3 to L423–9 of the French Consumer Code.
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members who received compensation at the end of the procedure.34 It seems that the 
circumstances that only benefi ts accrue to group members and that the judgment’s res 
judicata eff ect covers only those group members who assented to it (since compensation 
can be paid only if the group member accepts it), were suffi  cient to extinguish the 
constitutional concerns.
Before the adoption of the above-mentioned decision, the French Constitutional 
Council had been referred to as an authority to justify the unconstitutionality of the opt-
out system, citing its famous decision of 1989,35 which dealt with a law that authorized 
trade unions to launch any action (‘toutes actions’) on behalf of the employee, including 
claims of unfair dismissal.36 Th is case can be distinguished from the use of the opt-
out system in small-claims procedures (although this question became academic, 
the 1989 decision was overruled by the 2014 decision). Pecuniary small claims can be 
clearly distinguished from employment law claims at large, especially unfair dismissal 
matters: the latter normally involve higher stakes, higher monetary value and may lead 
to the employee’s readmission (which entails personal consequences). Furthermore, the 
French Constitutional Council did not hold that representation without authorization 
or inference of the right of representation from the employee’s silence would be 
unconstitutional. Quite the contrary, it held that if the employee fails to object to the 
trade union’s procedure, he can be regarded as adhering to it.37 Th e French Constitutional 
Council treated this case rather as an issue of notice: the employee has to be informed 
by registered mail and actual notice has to be ensured.38 Accordingly, the requirement 
established by the French Constitutional Council concerning opt-out regimes was proper 
notice. It has to be taken into consideration that the French statute’s opt-out scheme 
covered the whole spectrum of employment claims and the constitutional requirements 
concerning the means of notice may be less stringent in case of small pecuniary claims.
Th e French rules adopted in 2014 seem to have gone beyond the constitutional 
requirements of the decision of 1989, since, although at the end of the procedure, they 
require the group members’ express acceptance of the award, they do not content 
themselves with tacit adherence.
Th e Hungarian Constitutional Court (Alkotmánybíróság) examined the problem 
of ‘representation without authorization’ in a few cases. In the early 1990s Hungarian 
law contained certain rules that authorized trade unions and the attorney-general to 
launch actions without authorization from the party.39 Th ese laws had a very peculiar 
34 Decision 2014–690 of 13 March 2014 (Le 14 novembre 2014, JORF n°0065 du 18 mars 2014, Texte n° 2, 
Décision n° 2014–690 DC du 13 mars 2014), para. 10 and 16.
35 Decision 2014–690 of 25 July 1989 (Décision n° 89–257 DC du 25 juillet 1989).
36 Ibid., para. 25.
37 Ibid., para. 25–26.
38 Ibid., para. 26.
39 Constitutional Court Decision No. 8/1990 (April, 23) (trade unions); Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 1/1994 (January, 7) (attorney general).
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feature: the right of representation of these entities was general and mandatory, that is, 
they not only lacked the party’s authorization, but the represented person could not opt 
out and terminate his own action. Th ese rules were struck down by the Constitutional 
Court. However, the court also established that, if justifi ed, ‘representation without 
authorization’ can be constitutional.  It found that it is in line with the constitutional 
requirements, if the attorney-general is authorized to proceed in case the obligee is 
not able to protect his rights for whatever reason, considering this to be an inevitable 
restriction of the right of disposition. Th e Court also established that it is the state’s 
constitutional duty to safeguard the rights of persons who cannot enforce or protect 
their rights and the state does have to ensure that one of its entities proceeds to protect 
the rights of individuals.
In sum, although opt-out collective redress may entail constitutional concerns in 
some EU Member States, the above arguments and jurisprudence suggest that it is far 
from irreconcilable with the constitutional traditions common to the Member States of 
the EU.
B. OPT-OUT COLLECTIVE REDRESS IS ALIEN TO CONTINENTAL 
LEGAL TRADITIONS
Th is statement is, in fact, not true (it may have been true some decades ago). EU law itself 
contains a very important and popular opt-out mechanism that permits representation 
without authorization (Injunction Directive), and there is a number of Member States 
that enable the enforcement of pecuniary claims in an opt-out system (as will be 
discussed below).
Th e Injunction Directive covers 13 consumer protection directives and empowers 
various entities to launch proceedings for a declaratory judgment or injunction on behalf 
of a class of unidentifi ed consumers, without a need for any individual authorization or 
assent. What is more, this procedure is, literally speaking, not an opt-out scheme (in fact, 
it is ‘worse’), since it does not make it possible for group members to leave the group: 
that is, group members cannot opt out even if they want to – they are stuck in the group. 
Although pecuniary claims cannot be enforced by means of this mechanism, from the 
perspective of legal tradition this should make no diff erence, since both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary claims are, legally speaking, claims. It seems that there is no legitimate 
reason to accept the opt-out system for declaratory judgments and injunctions and to 
pronounce this alien for pecuniary claims.
Although the opt-out system does qualify as a minority position in Europe, it is far 
from being unknown in the Old World. Currently, in the European Union there are nine 
Member States where it is possible to enforce pecuniary claims in an opt-out system: 
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Bulgaria,40 Belgium,41 Denmark42 and Norway,43 Hungary,44 Portugal,45 Spain46 and 
the United Kingdom.47 As illustrated above, although French law adopted a unique 
pattern, which formally retained the requirement of an opt-in, the French system can be 
characterized as a de facto opt-out system. Th is means that approximately one-third of 
the Member States has an opt-out system in place. So if opt-out collective redress is alien 
to (continental) Europe, then the aliens are among us.48
40 Chapter 33, Sections 379–388 of the Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure, for the English version of 
the statutory text see the Bulgarian Supreme Court’s website, www.vks.bg/english/vksen_p04_02.
htm#Chapter_Th irty-Th ree. See A. Katzarsky and G. Georgiev, ‘Chapter 11: Bulgaria’, in I. Dodds-
Smith and A. Brown (eds.), Th e International Comparative Legal Guide to Class & Group Actions 20 
opt-in, the French system can be characterized as a de facto opt-out systemor the opt-out model (Global 
Legal Group, 2012), www.georg-tod.com/documents/news/1362581962-CA13%20Chapter%2011%20
Bulgaria.pdf, p. 64.
41 Th e Belgian system leaves it to the judge to decide whether the action should be conducted according to 
the opt-in or the opt-out model. Law Inserting a Title 2 on ‘Collective Compensation Action’ in Book 
XVII ‘Special Jurisdictional Procedures’ of the Code of Economic Law, Mar. 28, 2014, Moniteur Belge 
(M.B.) (Offi  cial Gazette of Belgium (Mar. 29, 2014) (Loi portant insertion d’un titre 2 ‘De l’action en 
réparation collective’ au livre XVII ‘Procédures juridictionnelles particulières’ du Code de droit économique 
et portant insertion des défi nitions propres au livre XVII dans le livre 1er du Code de droit économique).
42 In Denmark, it is up to the court to decide whether the proceeding has to be conducted in the opt-in or 
the opt-out system. Sections 254a-254e of the Administration of Justice Act (Lov om rettens pleje). Th e 
rules on collective redress were inserted through Act no. 181 of February 28, 2007. See D. Frølich and 
M. Schwartz Nielsen, ‘Chapter 14: Denmark’, in I. Dodds-Smith and A. Brown (eds.), Th e International 
Comparative Legal Guide to Class & Group Actions 20 opt-in, the French system can be characterized as 
a de facto opt-out systemor the opt-out model (Global Legal Group, 2012), www.lundelmersandager.dk/
sfs.php?fi d=caam, p. 89.
43 In Norway, it is up to the court to decide whether the proceeding has to be carried out in the opt-in or 
the opt-out system. Chapter 35 of Act of 17 June 2005 no. 90 relating to mediation and procedure in civil 
disputes (Th e Dispute Act) (Lov om mekling og rettergang i sivile tvister (tvisteloven)). See P. Kiurunen 
and N. Lindström, ‘Chapter 9: Norway’, in P.G. Karlsgodt (ed.), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions Around the Globe (OUP, 2012), p. 234.
44 Section 92 of Hungarian Competition Act (1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és 
a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról); Sections 38–38/A of Hungarian Consumer Protection Act (Act CLV of 
1997) (1997. évi CLV. törvény a fogyasztóvédelemről).
45 Act 83/95 on Procedural Participation and Popular Action (Lei n.o 83/95, de 31 de Agosto, Direito de 
Participação Procedimental e de Acção Popular).
46 Section 11 of Spanish Code on Civil Procedure (Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil).
47 Part 19.6 (Representative parties with same interest) of Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). See N. Andrews, 
‘Multi-party proceedings in England: representative and group actions’, 11 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law (2001), p. 251–252; E.F. Sherman, ‘Group litigation under foreign legal systems: 
variations and alternatives to American class action’, 52 DePaul Law Review (2002), p. 401–432. In the 
mechanism recently introduced in competition law, the Competition Appeal Tribunal decides, in the 
collective proceedings order, on whether the procedure has to be carried out in the opt-in or the opt-out 
system, Sections 47A-49E of Competition Act 1998, inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015. See S. Weber Waller, ‘Th e Fall and Rise of the Antitrust Class Action’, SSRN (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641867, p. 21–24.
48 C.I. Nagy, ‘A csoportos igényérvényesítés összehasonlító jogi modelljei II. A csoportos igényérvényesítés 
európai modelljei és az összehasonlító jogi modellek tanulságai’, 54 Külgazdaság Jogi Melléklete (2010), 
p. 138–143.
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Finally, it appears to be perverse to use tradition as a blocking argument when draft ing 
a new scheme. It hardly seems to be reasonable to reject a new regulatory solution simply 
on the basis that it is new. Th e opt-out scheme is, indeed, a novel regulatory solution in 
continental Europe, however, it can be judged only aft er a full-blown analysis, taking 
into account its merits and drawbacks. It would be truly perverse to say, in the course 
of searching for the regulatory solution to be adopted, that a new regulatory concept 
should not be adopted simply because it is new and not part of the law (the law which is 
considered for reform).
Th e innovation of today is the tradition of tomorrow. Although its roots can be traced 
back to equity,49 the institution of class action was inserted into US federal procedural 
law only in 1938. And this regime was profoundly revised in 1966 and subjected to some 
minor changes in 2003.50 It can be established that the US system of class action was 
fi nalized in 1966, since it was the 1966 reform that made the wide-spread use of class 
actions possible.51 Today, this regulation is regarded as the ‘American tradition’, contrary 
to the continental tradition.
C. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY THE MEMBERS OF THE 
GROUP AND TO PROVE GROUP MEMBERSHIP
Th e Recommendation suggests that in opt-out systems group members do not (or 
normally do not) get their money and the benefi ts of opt-out actions (that is, the money 
awarded) go to the group representatives. Th e Recommendation contends that ‘an “opt-
out” system may not be consistent with the central aim of collective redress, which is to 
obtain compensation for harm suff ered, since such persons are not identifi ed, and so the 
award will not be distributed to them’.52
Th e above assertion is based on a fatal misunderstanding. Just as opt-in systems, opt-
out collective redress mechanisms aim to provide recovery to group members; and in the 
opt-out systems, as a general rule, the award is normally distributed to group members 
and they really get the money.53 Although in certain systems ‘fl uid recovery’ or ‘cy pres’ 
49 Montgomery Ward & Co. v Langer, 168 F2d 182, 187 (1948).
50 S.P. Dumain, ‘Recent amendments to Rule 23’, in Practising Law Institute, Current Developments 
in Federal Civil Practice 2005 (Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series) 
(Practising Law Institute Litigation 2005), p. 221–248; C.H. Edward, ‘Federal class action reform in the 
United States: past and future and where next?’, 69 Defense Counsel Journal (2002), p. 432–440.
51 See e.g. N.M. Pace, ‘Class actions in the United States of America: an overview of the process and 
the empirical literature’, Globalclassaction (2008), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/
fi les/documents/USA__National_Report.pdf, p. 2.
52 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law, p. 12, emphasis added.
53 On claims administration see K. Kinsella and S. Wheatman, ‘Chapter 14 – Class notice and claims 
administration’, in A.A. Foer and J.W. Cuneo (eds.), Th e International Handbook on Private Enforcement 
of Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2010), p. 273–274; K. Kinsella and S. Wheatman, ‘Chapter 13 – Class 
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is available,54 this does not have to be necessarily adopted along with the introduction of 
collective redress (though it is advisable).
Obviously, it is much simpler to allot the award in an opt-in system, since here group 
members are easily identifi ed by coming forward to join a legal action. However, the 
award can be distributed to group members also in the opt-out system, if group members 
are identifi able. It is a regulatory choice whether the availability of collective redress 
should be limited to cases where group members are clearly identifi able and how precise 
‘identifi ability’ should be required. However, in numerous cases, the court judgment 
can defi ne the group properly: by way of example, the subscribers of a dominant cable 
television company between January 1 and December 31, 2014; or those persons who had 
to pay a higher vehicle registration tax, which proved to be contrary to the rules of the 
internal market; or those EU citizens who had to pay a discriminatory tuition fee for the 
year of 2014. Such a defi nition would make group members easily identifi able.
Although it is true that in certain cases it is diffi  cult or even impossible to create a 
defi nition for identifying group members, this can be accomplished in numerous other 
cases. As a legislative option, identifi ability could be made a pre-requisite of collective 
redress. However, it would be perverse to argue that since the opt-out scheme would not 
work in certain cases, due to the lack of identifi ability, it should be abandoned also in 
cases where it would work, since group members are identifi able.
Contrary to the Recommendation’s assertion, in case of opt-out collective redress, the 
biggest trouble is not that group members are not identifi ed – since identifi ability can be 
made a pre-requisite. An important problem is that in certain cases group members are 
legally identifi able but not in practice. For instance, assume that taxi drivers fi x prices, 
thus overcharging customers.55 Although the violation of antitrust law is proven and 
notice and claims administration’, in A.A. Foer and R.M. Stutz (eds.), Private Enforcement of Antitrust 
Law in the United States (Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 338–348.
54 See J.C. Alexander, ‘An introduction to class action procedure in the United States’, Paper for Conference 
Debates over group litigation in comparative perspective (2000), http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/
classactionalexander.pdf, p.  16; A.A. Foer, ‘Chapter 14 – Cy pres as a remedy in private antitrust 
litigation’, in A.A. Foer and R.M. Stutz (eds.), Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States 
(Edward Elgar 2012), p. 349–364 (‘Th e normal remedies in a private antitrust case are a combination 
of injunctions and treble damages that are paid to the victim or victims of the anticompetitive activity. 
When an aggregate amount of damages is established, the primary objective is to distribute the 
damages to those who were injured. In antitrust class action litigation, however, it is oft en impossible 
or impracticable to compensate all victims. Administrative concerns may work against payments to 
individual plaintiff s, as in the case of an extremely large class where the fund is not suffi  cient to justify 
the transaction costs of distribution to individual claimants. Consequently, in some cases, there is 
money left  over in the form of unclaimed funds. In such cases, courts sometimes employ the doctrine 
of “cy pres” to put the unclaimed funds to “the next best use,” which may include awarding funds to 
public interest organizations or charities for purposes related to the case.’).
55 J.C. Alexander, ‘An introduction to class action procedure in the United States’, Paper for Conference 
Debates over group litigation in comparative perspective (2000), http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/
classactionalexander.pdf, p. 16.
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group members are legally identifi able, it is assumed that the vast majority of the victims 
would not be able to prove their membership, since they usually do not keep the receipts.
Nonetheless, even if group members cannot turn the award into cash, this does 
not necessarily entail that their share is paid out by the defendant (although it is easy 
to argue that the wrongdoer should not keep the windfall of his mischief). Collective 
litigation does not necessarily imply collective enforcement. Although it is submitted 
that collective redress should encompass collective enforcement (and it is a major 
shortcoming of the Recommendation that it ignores that, the purpose of the action, as far 
as pecuniary claims are concerned, is not a judgment but money), there is no indication 
in the Recommendation that collective redress would extend to enforcement as well.
Finally, it is submitted that while it is not inevitable that the share of non-identifi able 
group members is paid out to the group representative, it would be reasonable to oblige 
wrongdoers to pay compensation also for legally or practically non-identifi able group 
members. Th e law cannot leave the enrichment earned through an illegal conduct with the 
wrongdoer. From a social perspective, it is better to give a windfall to the group representative 
than to leave an illegal enrichment with the wrongdoer (it is to be noted that this would not 
even amount to a windfall, taking into account that the group representative does invest 
a lot in the enforcement of the claim). It is tempting to argue that this non-distributable 
money should be spent on a public interest purpose, like funding collective actions.
It is to be noted that an eff ective collective redress mechanism yields the highest 
benefi ts not when it is used but when it is not; collective redress may make practically 
unavailable civil recovery a reality. While in the absence of collective redress several 
rules and rights established by the law are regarded as practically non-existent (or 
unenforceable), eff ective collective redress makes the violation of these rules extremely 
risky and prompts enterprises to respect them.
D. OPT-OUT COLLECTIVE REDRESS WOULD LEAD TO A 
LITIGATION BOOM AND WOULD CREATE A BLACK-MAILING 
POTENTIAL FOR GROUP REPRESENTATIVES
Perhaps the most popular misunderstanding in respect of opt-out collective redress is 
that, similarly to US law, it would lead to a litigation boom and would enable group 
representatives, who aggregate a mass of claims, to blackmail defendants and to wring 
illegitimate settlements from them. Th ese fears are completely unfounded.
Th ere is no causality between the opt-out system and the alleged American litigation 
boom and blackmailing potential.  In the US, the number of class actions and the 
defendants’ inclination to settle are not due to the opt-out rule but to the regulatory 
and social environment that surrounds this model.56 Namely, US law contains a set of 
56 For a detailed presentation of the statistical data see C.I. Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law 
(2013), p. 490–495.
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rules that are unrelated to class actions but catalyze their operation. By way of example, 
under US law, generous punitive damages are available and certain statutes provide for 
treble damages;57 the ‘American rule’ on attorney’s fees does not follow the ‘loser pays’ 
principle (that is, the parties pay their attorney irrespective of the action’s outcome);58 
certain statutes (for example the Sherman Act, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) 
provide for one-way cost-shift ing: if the claimant wins, he is entitled to compensation 
for his reasonable attorney’s fees but this does not work the other way around; statistics 
demonstrate that the American society is much more litigious than the European;59 
the operation of litigators is normally based on contingency fees and law fi rms work 
according to an entrepreneurial model,60 where the law-fi rm invests money and working 
hours in the action, thus – in exchange for an appropriate risk premium – takes over the 
risks of litigation from the parties; fi nally, jury trials and extensive pre-trial discovery 
smooth things down for the claimant and reinforce these factors. Taking this into 
account, it is easy to see that the alleged litigation boom and black-mailing potential 
(provided they exist) are as much peculiar to individual actions as to class actions. Th ese 
are general features of the US system and not a specifi c characteristic of the class action.
Th e above is reinforced by practical experiments. Th e opt-out system is available in 
nine EU Member States. Most of these systems do not have a long history of its application, 
but none saw a ‘litigation boom’ (not even a ‘litigation pop’).61 In a continental legal 
and social environment, the opt-out system operates in a completely diff erent manner 
than in the US. Th e experience in Australia62 and Canada63 are also informative. In 
these countries, opt-out class action was introduced (at federal and state level) and no 
57 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman 
Tool, 532 U.S. 424, 432, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 1683 (2001).
58 C.I. Nagy, 54 Külgazdaság Jogi Melléklete (2010), p. 96–98.
59 See M. Gryphon, ‘Assessing the Eff ects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System: An 
Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform’, 8 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy (2011), p. 567; B.J. 
Rodger, ‘Editorial – Private Enforcement and Collective Redress: Th e Benefi ts of Empirical Research 
and Comparative Approaches’, 8 Competition Law Review (2011).
60 J.C. Alexander, ‘An introduction to class action procedure in the United States’, Paper for Conference 
Debates over group litigation in comparative perspective (2000), http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/
classactionalexander.pdf, p. 12. Although attorney commercials are prohibited or restricted in several 
EU Member States, recently these prohibitions were eliminated or soft ened in quite of few legal 
systems. See Commission Report on Competition in Professional Services, COM/2004/83 fi nalm p. 14; 
F.H. Stephen and J.H. Love, Regulation of the Legal Profession, in B. Boudewijn and G. de Geest (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Vol. III. (Cheltenham, 2000), p. 987–1017.
61 C.I. Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law (2013), p. 490–493.
62 In Australia, the institution of collective redress was introduced into federal law in 1992. Federal Court 
of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (No. 181 of 1991). See S. Stuart Clark and C. Harris, ‘Multi-plaintiff  
litigation in Australia: a comparative perspective’, 11 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law (2001), p. 289–320.
63 Several provinces of Canada introduced the institution of collective redress, such as British Columbia, 
Class Proceeding Act 1995, S.B.C. ch 21 (1995), Ontario, Class Proceeding Act 1992, S.O. ch 6 (1992), 
Quebec, Quebec Civil Code, Book IX., Newfoundland & Labrador, Class Actions Act, S.N.L., ch. C-18.1 
(2001) (Newfoundland & Labrador), és Saskatchewan, Th e Class Actions Act, S.S., ch. C-12.01 (2001) 
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litigation boom occurred.64 Finally, it should not be disregarded that Europe is not the 
only region of the world where collective redress had to be accommodated in a civil-law 
environment: this happened in a number of Latin-American countries.65
According to European fears, the group representative can create an aggregate 
of claims through bunching a vast number of demands and can force out an unfair 
settlement with the defendant even in frivolous cases.66 However, this blackmailing 
potential is an illusion. A group representative enforcing a € 1 billion claim-aggregate has 
exactly the same blackmailing potential as the representative of a € 1 billion individual 
claim. If European eyes see a black-mailing potential in the US system, this is not due 
to the US class action system but to those principles and rules of general application 
which characterize the US system at large. For instance, because of the ‘American rule’ 
on attorney’s fees, for the defendant, a settlement is a more attractive alternative, even 
if the plaintiff ’s case is weak, since the defendant has to bear the attorney’s fees, even if 
he wins the case and the claimant’s claim proves to be frivolous. If the defendant enters 
a settlement, he can save the attorney’s fees. Furthermore, punitive damages and treble 
damages may multiply the expected costs of the action.
Assume that the legal costs attached to the action are €  200,000–200,000 for the 
claimant and the defendant, respectively; they have to bear these expenses irrespective of 
the outcome of the action. Th e claim’s value is € 1,000,000 and the claimant has a very weak 
case with a minuscule 10% chance to win. Th e claimant sues for the breach of antitrust 
rules, thus, under the Sherman Act, he is entitled to treble damages; furthermore, as an 
exception to the general ‘American rule’, he can claim reimbursement for his reasonable 
attorney’s fees in case he wins (that is, cost-shift ing is one-way).67
Accordingly, (if disregarding court fees, infl ation and the procedure’s length) a 
rational plaintiff  would take a decision on whether to sue on the basis of the following 
calculation. On the expected costs side, the expenses run to €  200,000. Th e expected 
income is the product of the claim’s value and the reimbursement for legal costs and 
the chance of success: € 320,000 = (€ 1,000,000 x 3 + € 200,000) x 10%. As a corollary, 
it is rational for the plaintiff  to sue, the balance of the law-suit is positive: € 320,000 – 
€ 200,000 = € 120,000.
Th e defendant, on the expenses side, also faces attorney’s fees in value of € 200,000 
(which are not recoverable) and there is 10% chance that he will have to pay 3 x € 1,000,000 
(Saskatchewan). Th e institution of class action is also part of the Federal Court Rules, Federal Court 
Rules, Part 4, 299.1–42.
64 For a detailed presentation of the statistical data see C.I. Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law 
(2013), p. 493–495.
65 See A. Gidi, ‘Class Actions in Brazil – A Model for Civil Law Countries’, 51 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (2003), p. 311–408; A. Gidi, ‘Th e Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: 
the Case of Latin America’, 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2012), p. 901–940.
66 Commission Communication Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, 
COM(2013) 401 fi nal, p. 7–8.
67 15 U.S.C. §15.
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as damages and € 200,000 as reimbursement for the plaintiff ’s reasonable attorney’s fees: 
(€ 1,000,000 x 3 + € 200,000) x 10% + € 200,000 = € 520,000. On the other hand, he cannot 
expect any income, since even if he wins, the only ‘return’ is that he does not have to pay 
damages (the expected income is € 0). Accordingly, the defendant’s balance is negative (€ 
-520,000 = € -200,000 + € -320,000). Th e defendant’s expected loss attached to the action 
is very signifi cant in comparison to the claim’s value, although he has 90% chance to win.
Under such circumstances, the parties will endeavor to reach a settlement, where the 
plaintiff  does not accept less than € 120,000 and the defendant is not willing pay more 
than € 520,000. Th e precise amount will depend on the parties’ bargaining skills. It is 
noteworthy that in the above case it is rational for the defendant to pay a sum that is 
higher than 50% of the claim’s value, while the chance that the plaintiff  wins is only 10%.
If we put the above case in a continental legal environment, it would not be rational 
for the plaintiff  to sue due to the low chance of success. For the plaintiff , the action’s 
expected income is €  100,000 (€  1,000,000 x 10%), while there is 90% chance that he 
will have to bear both his and the winning defendant’s legal costs (€  400,000 x 90% 
= € 360,000). Accordingly, the plaintiff ’s balance is negative (€ 100,000 – € 360,000 = 
€ -260,000); this is due to the lack of treble damages and the European approach on legal 
costs (two-way cost shift ing).
§4. FUNDING AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
(THE ‘LOSER PAYS’ PRINCIPLE, NO CONTINGENCY 
FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, REPRESENTATION 
LIMITED TO NON-PROFIT ENTITIES)
Th e Recommendation introduces safeguards in order to obviate the incentives to 
abuse the mechanism of collective redress: it makes the use of the ‘loser pays’ principle 
mandatory,68 excludes, at least in principle, contingency fees69 and prohibits punitive 
damages.70 Furthermore, it restricts group representation to non-profi t entities.71
Th ese safeguards appear to be excessive, taking into account that the Recommendation 
explains the choice of the ‘opt-in’ system with the consideration of obviating abusive 
practices. Th e Recommendation’s insistence on not adopting legal concepts peculiar 
to the US regulatory environment surrounding the operation of the US class action 
68 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law, para 13.
69 Ibid. para. 29–30. According to the Recommendation, contingency fees can be permitted only 
exceptionally. (‘Th e Member States that exceptionally allow for contingency fees should provide 
for appropriate national regulation of those fees in collective redress cases, taking into account in 
particular the right to full compensation of the members of the claimant party.’).
70 Ibid., para. 31.
71 Ibid., para. 4.
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suggests that, on the other side of the Atlantic, it is not the opt-out system but its 
legal environment that may be responsible for the alleged plethora of class actions. 
Furthermore, contingency fees and punitive (or exemplary) damages are available 
in some Member States. Contingency fees are actually lawful in quite of few Member 
States.72 Albeit that the amount of exemplary damages awarded in European common 
law systems is tiny (as compared to US punitive awards), this concept is a solid part of 
Anglo-Saxon legal systems.73
Th e biggest trouble is, however, that the Recommendation, in essence, interdicts the 
risk premium devices of US law, which are rather unpopular in Europe, anyway, while 
it fails to off er any surrogate. Th e function and eff ects of contingency fees and punitive 
damages are to provide a risk premium to group representatives, in order to compensate 
them for the risk they run in favour of group members. Th e Recommendation, as a 
general principle, prohibits these tools, while it fails to off er anything in exchange to 
tackle the problem of risk premium.
It is economically rational for group representatives to enforce the claims of group 
members if all the costs related to the collective action can be shift ed on the losing 
defendant and group representatives are granted a risk premium, that is, if they win 
they get a reimbursement higher than their actual costs in order to compensate them 
for the risk they ran when instituting the proceeding.74 Th e ‘American rule’ on attorney’s 
fees, contingency fees and punitive damages are meant to be a risk premium, or simply 
have such an unintended eff ect. Th e purpose of the ‘American rule’ is to shift  some of 
the risks attached to the plaintiff ’s or group representative’s failure onto the defendant.75 
Super-compensatory damages are clearly risk premiums; punitive and treble damages 
are meant to incite the plaintiff  to litigate through compensating him for the risks he 
runs due to the litigation.76 Contingency fees may also be regarded as risk premiums, 
since they are admittedly higher than the attorney’s fees charged in case of no risk.77
72 See S.M. Grace, ‘Strengthening Investor Confi dence in Europe: U.S. style Securities Class Actions and 
the ac quis communautaire’, 15 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y (2006), p. 281, 287–288; ‘Comparative report’, 
in D. Waelbroeck, D. Slater and G. Even-Shoshan (eds.), Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages 
in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules (Ashurst, 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf, p.  93–94, 116–17; C. Leskinen, 
‘Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules’, 8 Competition L. Rev. (2011), p. 87, 
98–105.
73 V. Wilcox, ‘Punitive Damages in England’, in H. Koziol and V. Wilcox (eds.), Punitive Damages: 
Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives (Springer, 2009), p. 7–54.
74 C.I. Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law (2013), p. 495–497.
75 See M. Gryphon, 8 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy (2011), p. 569.
76 V. Behr, ‘Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies Towards Approximation 
of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts’, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2003), p.  105, 120–121; L.T. Visscher, 
‘Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages’, Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives 
(Springer, 2009), p.  224; H. Koziol, ‘Punitive Damages: Admission into the Seventh Legal Heaven 
or Eternal Damnation? Comparative Report and Conclusions’, in in H. Koziol and V. Wilcox (eds.), 
Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives (Springer, 2009), p. 304.
77 C. István Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law (2013), p. 495–496.
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Th e Recommendation prohibits the use of these legal institutions (which are, by the 
way, normally not used in Europe) without off ering anything in exchange in order to 
tackle the problem of risk premium. As demonstrated above, the repercussions and the 
plethora of opt-out collective litigation (US class action) would not emerge, when putting 
this regulatory mechanism in the current European environment. At the same time, it 
has to be noted that in US law it is the provision of generous risk premiums that made 
the operation of the US class action so intensive.78 Ironically, the measures that could 
make collective litigation eff ective would move the European regulatory environment 
towards US law. All the measures the absence of which explained why Europe should not 
fear the opt-out class action are actually the functional equivalents of a risk premium, 
even if they are of general application and are not specifi c to class actions. On the other 
hand, without an appropriate risk premium the European system could not be made 
really wide-spread.79
It would be an exaggeration to say that this is a vicious circle; it is not, it is a trade-off . 
Th e legislators (EU and national) have to fi nd the point of balance. Th e determination of 
the risk premium does allow fi ne-tuning.
Furthermore, the fact that the risk premium may entail risks certainly does not refute 
the thesis that in Europe the opt-out class action would not entail the same consequences 
it brings forth in the US. Th e introduction of the opt-out class action would be reasonable 
also in case the law aff ords no risk premium to the group representative. Th e group 
representative may take up the case for various non-economic reasons; and the limited 
European experience suggests that civil non-profi t organizations may be inclined to 
protect the rights of group members even in case this, from an economic perspective, 
does not pay out.
All in all, the Recommendation’s main fl aw is that, in essence, it interdicts the risk 
premium devices of US law, while it fails off er any surrogate. In the absence of an adequate 
risk premium it will not pay out for the group representative to take up the case; and even 
if the group representative is a non-profi t organization, the entity’s expected costs and 
expected income have to be in balance to make the system sustainable.
§5. CONCLUSIONS
Th e debate in Europe on ‘whether to opt out or not to opt out’ has become fairly 
repetitious and aft er the Commission’s Recommendation it appears that Europe is where 
it was a decade ago. Th e scholarship is replete with pieces supporting the introduction 
of the opt-out model in Europe and, disregarding the misconceived references to legal 
tradition and the phobia of foreign legal solutions, one can rarely fi nd any analysis that 
78 Ibid., p. 489, 497.
79 C.I. Nagy, 19 Columbia Journal of European Law (2013), p. 496.
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would demonstrate in a convincing manner that the introduction of the opt-out model 
in Europe would lead to a litigation boom, settlements forced out by black-mailing and 
abuses. If someone sees these in the US system, he also has to see that in class action cases 
group representatives have the very same black-mailing potential (if any) as the plaintiff  
in an individual action. Th e US litigation landscape is shaped by legal institutions 
like punitive and treble damages, the ‘American rule’ on attorney’s fee and one-way-
cost shift ing in certain cases, contingency fees, entrepreneurial law fi rms and litigious 
attitudes. Th is regulatory and social environment, which is responsible for what many 
Europeans attribute to class actions, is completely missing in Europe.
It seems that the Commission could not avoid falling in the ‘ice-cream-murder’ 
fallacy. Studies show that the consumption of ice cream and murders are positively 
correlated: the more ice cream is sold, the more homicides are committed; and vice versa, 
the less ice cream is consumed, the less people are killed. Is there correlation between the 
two? Yes, of course. Would it be reasonable to draw the conclusion that there is causation? 
No, of course, it would not. Both ice cream consumption and murders increase in the 
summertime, when people stay out later. Correlation does not mean causation. Th e 
Commission perceived that there is correlation between the US class action and certain 
allegedly abusive practices. However, it appears to have failed to have a closer look at 
class actions to see whether there is causation between the two or it is simple correlation.
Be it as it may, it is especially disappointing to see that the European debate, as 
mirrored in the Commission’s Recommendation, is still stuck in the question of whether 
an opt-out or an opt-in system were preferable. Although this is a truly important issue, 
it seems to be outdated in a certain sense and is losing weight in the online age where 
group members can simply ‘click in’. Th e success of collective redress hinges on funding, 
including the question of the allocation of a risk premium. An opt-out system does 
lessen the group’s organization costs signifi cantly and makes collective redress possible 
in cases where such costs proved to be prohibitive. However, collective redress cannot 
be truly eff ective without appropriate funding. Th is does not mean that no cases would 
be brought to court; this means that the practical success of collective redress would 
not be as considerable as it should be. Th is is underpinned by both economics analysis 
and experience: in Europe, there are (relatively) successful opt-in and unsuccessful opt-
out systems. Without slighting the relevance of the opt-out-opt-in controversy, it seems 
that, as a matter of fact, the pivotal question of collective redress is funding. It is not 
a co-incidence (that is, not a mere correlation but causation) that the most successful 
class action mechanism provides for appropriate funding in the form of a variety of legal 
institutions (for example, punitive damages, treble damages, one-way cost shift ing).
However, it has to be stressed that the need for a risk premium is certainly not an 
argument against the introduction of an opt-out system, especially, because the group 
representative may espouse the collective proceeding also for diff erent non-economic 
reasons. Collective redress can work without a risk-premium but its intensity will be 
lower than it could be.
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Notwithstanding this, the Commission’s Recommendation sanctions the phobia of 
foreign legal solutions prevailing in Europe. Th e Recommendation is most disappointing, 
taking into account that although it applies only to ‘mass harm situations caused by 
violations of rights granted under Union law’80, it may have a chilling eff ect on European 
opt-out systems and on those national proposals that envisaged an opt-out scheme.
Th e Recommendation is rather disappointing, as some years ago the Commission had 
a progressive proposal for an opt-out system, which was fi nally withdrawn in October 
2009,81 demonstrating how eff ective the blend of intensive industry lobbying and the 
phobia of foreign legal solutions can be. It is noteworthy that numerous examples can be 
mentioned where unbiased national proposals for an opt-out system fell prey to powerful 
industry lobbying, which used legal traditionalism as a successful marketing weapon.82
Th e classical litigation system proceeds from the sample situation where Gaius sues 
Julius because of two casks of acetifi ed wine. Both of them are Roman citizens, are equal 
both in terms of money and capacity, have unlimited free time and happily visit the 
praetor to present their case. Th e reality of the 21st century is, however, not this. Th e age 
of masses is characterized by standardized contracts and standardized cases, and the 
law, long since, does not content itself with providing justice to Roman citizens only but 
wants to give justice for all. And it is rather common that individual entities face masses. 
Th e projection of the mass economy has already appeared in substantive law: the regime 
on unfair terms in standardized consumer contracts is based on the recognition of the 
fact that in the mass economy individual enterprises face masses. It would be highest 
time to recognize this also in procedural law.
Th is scenario is particularly frequent in matters involving the application of EU law 
(the Recommendation’s scope of application): in a huge part of these cases a mass of 
individuals encounters the state because the latter, by way of example, restricted free 
movement or adopted discriminatory measures. Th ere are numerous famous European 
cases, which deal with fundamental issues of EU law and have an enormous social 
relevance; still, due to the miniscule individual stakes involved, it is not comprehensible 
why it paid out for the individual plaintiff  to enter into a lengthy court action and to 
top this up with a preliminary ruling procedure, entailing further considerable delay. 
All these cases suggest that a workable collective redress mechanism could signifi cantly 
increase the eff ectiveness of the application of EU law.
80 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law, para. 1.
81 See M. Ioannidou, 8 Competition L. Rev. (2011), p. 59, 78–80.
82 As to England and Wales, see Th e Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report, 
Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions, (2008); as to Finland, see M. Välimäki, 
‘Introducing Class Actions in Finland – Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis 3’, SSRN (2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261623; as to France, see V. Magnier, ‘Class actions, group litigation & other 
forms of collective litigation – France’, Globalclassactions (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.
edu/sites/default/fi les/documents/France_National_Report.pdf, p. 4.
